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Abstract: In modern Shi΄i Islam, power constitutes a major concern for thinkers and movements 
alike. Above all, Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah stands as the most systematic Shi΄i thinker who produced 
an Islamic theory of power. The present article analyses Fadlallah’s concept of social power. In Islam and 
the Logic of Power (al-Islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa), he emphasised the importance of social solidarity, 
justice, and the obligation of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” as a means to create the ideal 
society. For him, this social model has a reciprocal relation to social power. Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah 
tells the tale of two societies: the weak and the strong, arguing that beliefs, unity and values determine the 
power of a community. He claims that the strong society is best illustrated by the fi rst Islamic community. 
He confronts it with the weak society which lacks unity and solidarity – echoing to a great extent con-
temporary Lebanon. Fadlallah’s social theory – embedded in his theology of power – transforms spiritual 
power into a collective deployment of action. He draws on a wide range of elements (Sunni, Shi΄i and 
Marxist) to create a coherent system of power in which social power is a mediator between the ideology 
of power and its political manifestation.
Keywords: Shi΄ism, empowerment, mobilisation, solidarity, organic unity, equilibrium, shari a΄, 
faith 
INTRODUCTION
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (1935–2010) was born in Iraq in a family of Lebanese 
origin. After concluding his studies in Najaf, the Iraqi centre of Shi΄i religious sciences, 
in 1966 he moved to Lebanon and soon became the most prominent Shi΄i jurist in the 
country. He founded “The Higher Islamic Legal Institute”, in which several later promi-
nent religious scholars and political activists – affi liated with the Hezbollah – studied. By 
the early 1980s, he gradually became the leading religious fi gure in the Shi΄i community. 
His book, Islam and the Logic of Power, written in 1976 amidst the devastating bombard-
ments of the Lebanese civil war offers the Shi΄i community a narrative of social power 
in which social values, relations and collective action are mobilised to build a grassroot 
226 Bianka SPEIDL
Shi΄i social movement. Much of Fadlallah’s social ideas were implemented in the social 
programme of Hezbollah.
In the following, I pay close attention to Fadlallah’s concept of social empowerment 
in relation to four contexts. First, I analyze his views with regard to the Shi΄i context. 
Second, I highlight his binary understanding of social weakness and power. Third, I em-
phasize Fadlallah’s social functionalism, discussing his debt to Durkheim. Finally, it will 
be shown that his social thought found an echo in the Shi΄i social activism.
1. SOCIAL THOUGHT IN MODERN SHI΄ISM
Responding to social challenges from an Islamic perspective was a concern to the 
most infl uential thinkers of Shi΄ism in the last century. Above all, Ali Shari a΄ti and Mu-
hammad Baqir al-Sadr are considered as the major Shi΄i social theorists. Their primary 
aim was to defi ne the Islamic social philosophy and to differentiate it from the Western 
intellectual tradition. Both al-Sadr and Shari a΄ti aimed to provide Islamic answers to the 
most dominant and appealing Western ideologies such as Marxism and capitalism.1 In 
particular, Marxism was a direct rival to Shi΄ism in Iran and Iraq in the 1960s with its 
revolutionary call to the liberation of the oppressed. Due the great appeal of Marxist 
thought to the young and impoverished Shi a΄, religious scholars and intellectuals had to 
craft a persuasive social thought in order to cope with the Marxist dominance in social 
theory. This meant the need to adopt some crucial Marxist concepts by reinterpreting the 
religious doctrines and “Islamising” its revolutionary agenda.
In Iran, Shari a΄ti set out to rediscover the Qur’an in the light of Marxism and existen-
tialism, and presented revolutionary ideas by applying religious symbolism. He transformed 
Shi΄ism into a theology of liberation. His ideas about society are compiled in a volume 
entitled On the Sociology of Islam that consists of his lectures given in 1968 specifi cally 
dedicated to the various aspects of his social thought. In Iraq, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr 
wrote one book specifi cally dedicated to the analysis of Islamic society: Contemporary Man 
and the Social Problem, but other volumes such as al-Madrasa al-Qur’aniya or the posthu-
mously published Our Society also contain his essays and lectures on social issues. 
In Lebanon, Fadlallah had to transform the theology of weakness prevalent among 
the Lebanese Shi a΄ into the theology of force. Therefore, he reconfi gured religion by se-
lecting and emphasizing the elements of strength and discarding elements of weakness. 
He was concerned with the social structure and social values from the perspective of their 
relation to the quality and quantity of social strength they produce. Fadlallah labelled 
any interpretation as destructive that opposed the understanding of Islam in general and 
Shi΄ism in particular as the only solid and legitimate base for social empowerment. 
His focus – all through the book – lies on understanding power. He formulated his 
concept based on the Shi΄i dissatisfaction with their social conditions. Also, he was aware 
that several secular, revolutionary political factions tried to attract and recruit the Shi a΄. 
1 Several studies dealt with the social thought of Shari a΄ti and al-Sadr. For example, see: ALATAS 1999: 
113–129;  IBRAHIM 1997; AKHAVI 1988: 404–431; YADEGARI 1984: 53–59; DABLA 1983: 277–282; AKHAVI 1983: 
125–144.
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This fact prompted him to formulate his social concept as a prelude and prerequisite for 
activism and political change. By the late 1960s, the social status of the Shi a΄ became 
a matter on which the survival of the community depended. In Islam and the Logic of 
Power, Fadlallah tells the tale of two societies: the weak and the strong. He argues that 
beliefs, unity and values determine the power of a community. Fadlallah claims that the 
strong society is best illustrated by the fi rst Islamic community. He confronts it with the 
weak society which lacks unity and solidarity – echoing to a great extent contemporary 
Lebanon.
 
2. FADLALLAH’S SOCIAL THEORY
In Fadlallah’s interpretation, society is the sphere in which power is embodied, the 
fi rst concrete empowerment of the Shi΄i community is realised, and the continuity of the 
Islamic message is maintained. Social power comprises social values, relations and col-
lective action. It allows, as a fi rst stage, the building of bottom up power in contrast with 
bottom down empowerment through politics. This mechanism fi ts better to the paradigm 
of gradual transformation as it engenders power in the various social structures – such as 
family, education, economy –, rendering it sustainable. It helps to deracinate quietism and 
passivity at their roots and makes the social autonomy of the Shi΄i community possible. 
Fadlallah was aware of the importance of social power to provide the Lebanese Shi a΄ with 
its own social assets. He sought to give it social freedom (from want, poverty and misery) 
and confi dence before it has access to political power. 
Fadlallah starts his study of social strength by stating that there is no specifi c and di-
rect analysis of social strength in either the Qur’an or in the reported traditions. Therefore 
he sets out to construe a comprehensive essay on this issue by embracing its intellectual, 
behavioral and legal aspects. The chapter on “Social power” comes after spiritual power 
and precedes a series of chapters on political power. Thus in the book it provides a passage 
from individual power – as put forward in his concept of theology and spirituality – to-
wards attaining political power through social mobilisation. Therefore, it can be said that 
social power is the bridge between belief and revolution.
Fadlallah derives the base principles of the social formula and social strength from 
the Qur’an, however, in many cases he refers to the Prophetic and Twelver Shi΄i tradi-
tions as well. His argument on the interrelatedness of salvation and the social formula, 
the characterization of the fi rst Muslim community, the description of weak society, the 
link between social cohesion and personal responsibility, and the importance of unity are 
substantiated by exclusively Qur’anic passages as the primary source regarding the fi rst 
Muslim community and the sacred common ground for Sunnis and Shi΄ites.
3. WEAK SOCIETY: FADLALLAH’S SOCIAL CRITICISM
In Fadlallah’s perception, a weak society is the one that lacks social coherence. The 
lack of shared values, commitments and responsibilities exercise a centrifugal power 
that leads to its destruction. He illustrates weak society by the Jewish community of the 
Prophet’s time. The Jews of Medina 
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had confl icting personal interests that made each faction or even each person an in-
dependent entity whose interests and goals confl icted with those of the others in the 
community… [The] difference in feelings, inclinations and orientations that turns 
into differing plans, actions, stances […] is in fact internal fragmentation that trans-
forms into an external one.2
In Fadlallah’s thought, weakness is not an attribute, rather it is a condition in which 
the community lacks the strategic power needed to maintain its integrity, exercise its in-
terests and spread its values. Fadlallah considers attitudes based on individual inclinations 
and aspirations as by-products of human civilisation. Decline occurs when the individu-
al’s attachment to society is weakened and ego-centrism prevails. Such society becomes 
defenseless and paralyzed. The abandonment of supreme values that cement commitment 
and loyalty in the individual towards the community obliterate solidarity and create a sys-
tem of injustice and inequality. Religion in general and Islam in particular provides such 
values and guides their implementation.3
In Islam and the Logic of Power, manifestations of weakness are explored in three 
major aspects of social life: the intellectual, the emotional, and the practical domains. At 
the intellectual level, Fadlallah criticizes certain groups whose views pose a direct threat 
to social unity. He identifi es three of them as particularly harmful: the luxury elite, which 
dominates and exploits others; the dividing elite of religious scholars and politicians, who 
seek to divide society so that they can exploit it to promote their own interests; and the 
heretics and the non-believers, who attack the belief of the Muslim society and thus shake 
the principles on which its system of values is based.4 
Second, Fadlallah depicts the emotional roots of weakness. He considers feelings 
based on kinship and not on merit as a threat because they turn the absolute religious 
values into contingent ideas and substitute faith with human considerations. Serving the 
interests and contributing to the mission of the community enjoys priority over any per-
sonal concerns or bonds. Only if Islamic values determine the thoughts and actions of the 
people, can the society be protected from individualist and destructive trends.5 
At the practical level, a weak society is characterized by corruption in all sectors 
of society. The only way to eradicate the roots of this corruption is to fulfi l the duty 
of “forbidding wrong”, rather than leaving the responsibility of dealing with it to the 
offi cial authority once it becomes a habit.6 There is a natural causality, through which 
passivity and negligence not only weaken a society but they eliminate any chances for 
re-empowering it.
Fadlallah, the Shi΄i jurist, extensively quotes Sunni sources to emphasise the respon-
sibility of the governed for their just governance and to eliminate deviation from among 
their ranks. On the one hand, highlighting the requirement of unity demands a discourse 
2 FADLALLAH 1985: 121. 
3 FADLALLAH 1985: 122.
4 FADLALLAH 1985: 127–132.
5 FADLALLAH 1985: 139–141.
6 FADLALLAH 1985: 152–154.
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that embodies this value and makes it tangible for the reader. On the other hand, it refl ects 
the author’s wish to address the broader possible audience and shows his concern about 
the Sunni–Shi΄i divide in the Muslim community.
4. FADLALLAH’S VISION OF A STRONG SOCIETY
In contrast to the model of weak society – the Jewish community of Medina – Mu-
hammad’s community stands as the perfect ideal of a strong “society”. The fi rst Muslim 
society, as Fadlallah puts it, is a living, universal model which should be followed in the 
present and the future. He understands social strength as rooted in the interaction among 
its members.7 He offers a detailed analysis of how compassion, unity and common goals 
are embodied in social relations and practices, and eventually create indestructible social 
bonds. For Fadlallah 
[t]he term social strength refers to the strength that communities possess through 
unity the practical aspects of which are manifested in cohesion and mutual bonds 
among its members based on shared thought, feelings, and action towards a common 
goal.8 
Strength in this sense is rooted in and secured by unity which in turn is constructed 
by the interplay of three major factors: cohesion, ideology, and joint effort. Fadlallah sets 
to show the elements of this utopia in three areas which aim to replace the elements of 
weakness: the bond of belief–thought–feeling, social values, and organic unity. 
4.1 THE SOCIETY OF BELIEVERS: BONDS
OF BELIEF, THOUGHT AND FEELING 
Fadlallah is convinced of the interrelatedness of the social and spiritual aspects of 
human life.9 He asserts that God’s mercy towards mankind must be manifested in human 
relations.10 Thus, in a community of believers faith determines values and human interac-
tions. Thus the intellectual, emotional, and practical aspects are independent of material 
circumstances.11 In Fadlallah’s view, religious obligations function “as norms that govern 
relations and defi nes behaviour constitute the unifying element that reconcile the diverse 
components of a community”.12 In this context faith has tangible function: it creates real-
ity by shaping the consciousness of the individuals and, consequently, the norms of the 
community. As such, it secures order based on shared values and conventions. Religious 
 7 FADLALLAH 1985: 110.
 8 FADLALLAH 1985: 110.
 9 FADLALLAH 1985: 117.
10 FADLALLAH 1985: 115.
11 FADLALLAH 1985: 116.
12 FADLALLAH 1985: 122.
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institutions and practices refl ect, maintain, and create cohesion among those who partici-
pate in them.13 
Fadlallah argues that compassion is a general attitude based on the consideration of 
objective circumstances.14 By claiming that feelings and emotions are results of a personal 
internal process controlled by ideological convictions,15 Fadlallah’s aim is to pave a logical 
sequence that leads from compassion through social cohesion towards social strength.16
Fadlallah’s ideas regarding intellectual freedom carry considerable ambiguity. On the 
one hand, for him, the intellectual bases of social unity, the doctrinal beliefs as well as 
the general principles of life must be derived exclusively from the Qur’anic revelation and 
must be preserved without any concessions to ambiguity or dualism.17 Therefore propagat-
ing a view that challenges or attacks the ideological foundations of the society is forbid-
den. On the other hand, he accepts freedom in making an individual choice in ideological 
issues, and considers conducting dialogue with those who have differing views as both a 
right and a duty.18 However, Fadlallah explicitly stated that dialogue and co-operation in 
the fi nal count were only tools to defend and spread the Islamic doctrine.19
4.2 SOCIAL VALUES: JUSTICE, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SOLIDARITY 
Fadlallah maintains that the Qur’an is explicit in declaring practical action as the only 
real proof of the sincerity of belief.20 Man’s mission is to realize Divine justice on Earth, 
as the ultimate goal of Islam. Justice creates equilibrium in the society, a context within 
which Man is able to use his full capacities as God’s vice-regent. Fadlallah’s understand-
ing of “justice” is based on the revelation. In individual life, justice is embodied in actions 
corresponding to the divine decrees that assure the ethical dimension of life, and thus 
serve the ultimate interests of human beings.21 Applied justice is the governance that bases 
decisions on the revealed distinction between righteousness and deviation.22
Fadlallah argues that in Islam, social strength is built upon social cohesion through 
general and individual responsibilities.23 This implies fi rmness and rigour against those 
whose ideas or actions weaken society from inside. Thus an internal cooperation based 
on strength and violence is indispensable against those internal and external elements that 
promote disintegration and destruction.24 Such actions are manifestations of the universal 
13 FADLALLAH 1985: 124.
14 FADLALLAH 1985: 116.
15 FADLALLAH 1985: 136.
16 FADLALLAH 1985: 124.
17 FADLALLAH 1985: 125–127.
18 FADLALLAH 1985: 132–134.
19 FADLALLAH 1985: 132–134.
20 FADLALLAH 1985: 142.
21 FADLALLAH 1985: 196.
22 FADLALLAH 1985: 170.
23 FADLALLAH 1985: 143.
24 FADLALLAH 1985: 117–118.
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responsibility that each Muslim should bear.25 Practical involvement in social affairs can 
take many forms such as fi nancial help, social awareness, forgiving and compassion, and 
fulfi lling the obligation of “commanding right and forbidding wrong”.26 Fadlallah states 
that the refusal of a duty – abstaining from action – equals unbelief and both count as 
deviation.27 
Fadlallah believed that the distinct spirit of Islam is embodied in the traditions and 
institutions of the Muslim society, fi rst of all in the form of solidarity among its members. 
The Qur’anic statement that “believers are but brothers” (49:10) implies a spontaneous, 
practical responsibility for one another by the members of the community.28 Solidarity 
as a factor of social cohesion is a legal obligation, and falls under the scope of individual 
responsibility for the common goals of the community.29 
Fadlallah claims that social solidarity is more important than the accomplishment 
of certain rituals.30 He rejects that there is such a thing in Islam as individual salvation 
– and claims that spirituality offers no salvation unless it is achieved within a society.31 
He argues that law, ethics and society are so interrelated in Islam that no legislation that 
concerns the individual is devoid of social meaning, and a person’s evaluation is based on 
his social manners. Fadlallah pushes this argument to the extreme when he declares that 
in Islamic law the individual, as such, does not exist separated from society.32
4.3 ORGANIC UNITY 
Fadlallah compares social cohesion to the organising principle of a human body. He 
asserts that 
[t]he social and collective life of Muslims is an organic unity […] This suggests to 
man that he does not represent an independent entity, rather a part of an integrated 
whole.33 
This concept assumes that society is a dynamic, continuously changing unit that 
functions by responding to inner and outer infl uences. Consequently, social processes 
are made up of the web of human interactions. Individuals are mutually dependent, and 
there is no tension between the interest of the community and that of its members. The 
base principles of the community are embodied in all social phenomena and movement. 
Individuals can function only as components of a society; their existence gains its deep 
meaning through their contribution to the common goals. 
25 FADLALLAH 1985: 143.
26 FADLALLAH 1985: 148–151.
27 FADLALLAH 1985: 142.
28 FADLALLAH 1985: 138.
29 FADLALLAH 1985: 124.
30 FADLALLAH 1985: 147.
31 Fadlallah does not differentiate between community and society.
32 FADLALLAH 1985: 111.
33 FADLALLAH 1985: 136.
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For Fadlallah, what distinguishes the Islamic society from other contemporary or 
past formations is that those have been founded on tribal bonds, race or ethnicity; while 
in Islam bonds are based on the commitment to the revealed truth.34 In his view, shared 
visions on nature and society are indispensible for a community. The destruction of a 
normative order annihilates the morality built upon it and thus leads to chaos. Therefore 
it is a collective interest to preserve and protect or to restore the ideological foundations 
of a common value system.35 
Regarding the needs of the individual, Fadlallah insists that Islam promotes a bal-
anced stance between rigour and profaneness. Man has the right to satisfy his natural 
needs but he has to set limits for himself to prevent his desires become destructive. Reli-
gious regulations serve to assure integrity and equilibrium at the individual as well as at 
the social level. This way neither side is weakened or strengthened at the expense of the 
other. It is “a give and take process” that creates balance among the various constituents 
of the society. 
4.4 FADLALLAH’S FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH TO SOCIAL STRENGTH
As it is to be proved in the following paragraphs, Fadlallah’s model of the strong 
society refl ects Durkheim’s approach in many instances. In both paradigms, society is an 
organic unity whose constituents are mutually dependent members. These individuals are 
neither independent nor isolated; they have a specifi c function in the operation and main-
tenance of the system. The unity of the society is based on the equilibrium of its parts to 
which organic solidarity is essential. Society as a living organism is responsive to internal 
changes and external infl uences. Certain inputs may divert the predominant values of the 
society from justice, fairness and equity. Thus they cause loss of balance that challenges 
the stability of the system, and result in its dysfunction. 
For Fadlallah, social cohesion as the major source of social strength is based on in-
dividual faith, the individual responsibility of fulfi lling the legal commitments, and the 
common goals of the community.36 Society as a whole has a function in the context of the 
revelation: to implement divine justice on Earth. In his thought the individual and social 
aspects of the Islamist system are interrelated and consecutive. The state of disequilib-
rium occurs when the predominant values of the society diverge from the Islamic princi-
ples; that is practice becomes detached from theory.
Functionalism considers the system as “homeostatic” or self-regulating, and thus able 
to restore the equilibrium or level negative infl uences in order to secure the stability of the 
establishment.37 However, the self-regulating mechanism of a social system cannot oper-
ate without the various manifestations of force. Thus force and law are functional in con-
trolling the system and assuring the effectiveness of its parts. In Fadlallah’s theory, force 
and primarily the “force of law” is essential in maintaining the equilibrium of the Islamic 
34 FADLALLAH 1985: 118.
35 FADLALLAH 1985: 122.
36 FADLALLAH 1985: 124.
37 CONTEH-MORGAN 2007: 51.
The Views of Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah 233
social order. Fadlallah defi nes shari a΄ as “laws [that] point […] in the right direction and 
[…] show […] how to take steps to avoid any elements that might weaken society”.38 In 
this sense the elements of the Islamic law are comparable to “social facts” in Durkheim’s 
defi nition. For Durkheim, social facts have an independent existence greater and more 
objective than individuals’ perceptions. Furthermore, a social fact cannot be explained 
except by another social fact.39 In Islam – and thus for Fadlallah – the principles of Islamic 
law are ordained by God. The elements of Islamic law are instrumental to the realization 
of just society. Consequently, Fadlallah argues that “[i]t is the logical path towards social 
cohesion […] to [put] Islamic laws into practice”.40 
The biggest challenge to social equilibrium appears in the form of individual inclina-
tions and aspirations. For Durkheim, disorder results from the inappropriate function of 
“solidarity-producing social process[es]”, the most important of which is interaction be-
tween members of the society.41 Thus force in its various forms from regulation to punish-
ment is indispensible for the individual and consequently for the social equilibrium.
5. COMMANDING RIGHT
The last feature of a strong society is “commanding right and forbidding wrong”. It 
is a religious and political, communal and individual responsibility, and the success of its 
fulfi lment presupposes individual awareness as well as social organization. Solidarity as 
a comprehensive, practical attitude, a manifestation of divine mercy towards Man,42 is 
also a legal obligation.43 It creates social unity and integrity and consequently cohesion 
and strength. Therefore the attributes of solidarity and compassion fall under the scope 
of “commanding right and forbidding wrong”. Society, as a whole, is able to assume this 
function only if its members fulfi l their individual duties.44 In Fadlallah’s view, individual 
inclinations and aspirations constitute a centrifugal force that can endanger solidarity 
and justice, and as such need to be controlled. Therefore social justice and cohesion is 
inherently linked to the obligation of commanding right and forbidding wrong. It serves 
to regulate and unify the society, to build the base for a strong community, and to protect 
it against the individual tendencies that could result in its destruction.
Fadlallah defi nes “commanding right and forbidding wrong” as the basis of Islamic 
obligations. It prompts the fulfi lling of religious duties, and affects all branches of legis-
lation. As a social and political organizing principle it compels the rulers as well as the 
ruled to establish and maintain justice, order and security. For Fadlallah, it is a “kind of 
solidarity” that is binding on all Muslims, as an indication of the personal responsibility 
for the community.45 
38 FADLALLAH 1985: 124.
39 DURKHEIM 1982: 162.
40 FADLALLAH 1985: 124. See also: Chapter 4 on social power. 
41 POPE 1975: 364.
42 See also: “divine mercy is manifested in (includes) human interactions,” 115.  
43 FADLALLAH 1985: 144. 
44 FADLALLAH 1985: 152.
45 FADLALLAH 1985: 151.
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Since the consequences of doing wrong will not be limited to those who committed 
the wrongdoing, personal freedom cannot be devoid of social responsibility. Fadlallah ar-
gues that Man is free in his own issues but not in those that affect the society.46 Therefore 
“Islam does not believe in absolute freedom only if subordinated to the requirements of 
the message and the society”.47 He considers this a solution that harmonizes and unites the 
freedom of the individual and that of the community. 
Fadlallah states that the obligation of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” sets 
the perspective for human social awareness. If deviation is not confronted, the measure of 
action is lost.48 By wrong Fadlallah means corruption and deviation from religious norms. 
On a social level, it can take the form of despotism, aggression, deprivation of rights, mis-
treatment, harm, injustice or oppression. For him, forbidding includes armed resistance or 
– if the conditions are not guaranteed – boycott and exodus.49 Conversely, good serves the 
best interests of human beings, in both public and private life. As for the Muslim commu-
nity, those who do not comply with this duty deserve to be outcast.50 Neglecting the duty 
of “duty commanding right and forbidding wrong” would only lead to the destruction of 
faith and justice.51 For Fadlallah evil does not occur by God’s decree; rather it is a natural 
effect of human action or neglect. 
In the sphere of practice, Fadlallah evokes the individual’s responsibility to be alert 
and eradicate any form of deviation or corruption one experiences in daily life. Social 
decline is the natural consequence of neglecting the duty of “commanding right and for-
bidding wrong” on a personal as well as on a community level. 
6.  FADLALLAH’S STRONG SOCIETY AS A UTOPIA
For Fadlallah, Islamic society is the perfect social system in which the relationship 
between the members is that of brotherhood. It should follow the model of the Prophet’s 
city which established a unity of brotherhood between the immigrants from Quraysh’ 
and Muhammad’s supporters in Medina.52 His description of the fi rst Islamic community 
is considerably utopian. He sets the community of Medina as a measure of evaluation 
for contemporary societies without specifying the application of principles in a mod-
ern context. Had he not mingled the ideal with the real he would have discovered that 
the contemporary Muslim society such as the one in Medina according to Durkheim’s 
classifi cation fell into the category of mechanical solidarity.53 He hints at the problem 
of hypocrites, who lived among the Muslim community, but he does not elaborate on 
the issue and leaves other well-known internal confl icts without mention. Moreover, he 
46 FADLALLAH 1985: 157.
47 FADLALLAH 1985: 152.
48 FADLALLAH 1985: 155.
49 FADLALLAH 1985: 155–156.
50 FADLALLAH 1985: 152.
51 FADLALLAH 1985: 158.
52 FADLALLAH 1985: 138.
53 DURKHEIM 1994: 31–68.
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dedicates no attention to the problematic of the collapse of the Muhammadian ideal fol-
lowing his death. 
Similarly to his thought on theology and spirituality, where he separates the weak and 
strong interpretations of Muslim traditions, Fadlallah’s imagined society is selective. It 
carefully borrows elements to Muslim history, erasing Sunni–Shi΄i differences and elid-
ing the internal, structural, ideological issues that led to the disunity and fragmentation of 
Muslim societies. He attempts to derive the base principles operating the imagined com-
munity of Medina without providing meticulous analysis a propos their implementation in 
the variously polarized modern world and especially that of Lebanon. 
Also, he skips the questions regarding the connection between leadership and struc-
ture, and does not defi ne clearly the scope of individual and communal responsibility. It 
is particularly conspicuous vis-à-vis the obligation of “commanding right and forbidding 
wrong”.  Another problem with Fadlallah’s use of this concept is that this base principle 
is designed to govern an exclusively Muslim community. Without differentiating umma 
from society – delineated by the borders of the state – as inevitable in the Lebanese con-
text –, Fadlallah’s thought loses its realistic grounds. He designs an Islamic social project 
without studying “whether” and “to what extent” the various elements of this project fi t 
into the very context in which it is articulated.
7. FADLALLAH’S SOCIAL THOUGHT AND HIZBULLAH’S 1985 
OPEN LETTER
The aforementioned social empowerment of the Shi΄i community is best illustrated in 
the social activism of Hizbullah’s that fi lls the gap in social services where the Lebanese 
state fails. Islamist movements (e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood and its affi liated organisa-
tions in Egypt, Jordan and elsewhere) start competing with the regime at the social level 
and end at the political one. A close reading of Hizbullah’s 1985 Open Letter reveals that it 
echoes some features of Fadlallah’s social thought. Most importantly, it is emphatic about 
the cohesive force of common goals, and the commitment of the Islamic message to social 
justice and fi ghting oppression. Hizbullah’s Open Letter not only promotes solidarity with 
all Muslims in the world, but also extends the call for Muslim–Christian co-operation in 
forbidding wrong that is to resist oppression and colonial ambitions based on shared val-
ues and shared experience.54
The Open Letter declares that resistance is an individual as well as communal respon-
sibility.55 People are urged to unite for a major goal and get over minor issues – even differ-
ences in religion – that cause rifts.56 The declaration raises attention to the dangers of frag-
mentation as serving the divide and rule policy of the oppressive powers.57 The manifesto 
54 Open Letter 1985. http://archive.youkal.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=451:-
1985&catid=34&Itemid=156, 177.
55 Open Letter 181.
56 Open Letter 177.
57 Open Letter 184–185.
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defi nes Islam as a strong intellectual and political bond that creates and secures just rule. It 
insists that capitalism and socialism failed to set the foundations for a just and stable society, 
or to establish a balance between the individual and the community, between human nature 
and public interest.58 Such criticism reiterates Fadlallah’s argument on the interrelatedness 
of social equilibrium, justice and strength. In the Letter, Hizbullah maintains that Islamic 
governance must be based on the emotional unity of the members of the community. Fad-
lallah’s infl uence on the organization has never been admitted on either side; however, it is 
evident that their analysis of the societal reality shows signifi cant similarities. 
Hizbullah’s social strategy shows agreements with most values Fadlallah sees as ele-
ments of strength. Hizbullah put in place an effective and wide chain of charitable institu-
tions: schools, hospitals, surgeries, orphanages, and diverse social services that employ 
workers of various denominational background, and are open to serve clients of all faiths 
even though – following the Lebanese traditions – they are attended mostly by Shi΄is. The 
fi rst such institutions were set up as personal initiatives by Fadlallah from the late 1960s. 
His primary aim was to provide services to the poor Shi a΄, however, since the suburbs of 
pre-war Beirut were inhabited by religiously mixed population, Fadlallah’s institutions 
were always open to Sunnis, Druze and Christians. He considered social service as a 
means to create inter- and intra-religious cohesion, and also as the most authentic and 
peaceful tool of Islamisation. This tradition has been followed by Hizbullah since its of-
fi cial formation and also as a means of its politicization.59 
CONCLUSION
The “tale of two societies” – the weak and the strong – Fadlallah tells is a suggestive 
metaphor. In order to construct the basics of a strong Shi΄i community, he reinterpreted so-
cial principles of Islam. Fadlallah perceives social reality in dichotomies. His Manichaeism, 
a characteristic of radical and fundamentalist thinkers, becomes obvious. The principle of 
his evaluation of the various social and intellectual trends is twofold: whether they support 
the unity of the Muslim community, and whether they apply the principle of “commanding 
right and forbidding wrong”. For Fadlallah, spirituality does not offer salvation unless it is 
realized within the social matrix. Individualism is banned from his ideal society.
Fadlallah selected his arguments consciously in order to support the absolute validity of 
his social system. In this process, he showed no concerns for the suitability of his ideals in 
a multi-confessional environment like Lebanon. Similarly, he was not preoccupied to offer 
a realistic picture of the fi rst Muslim community which he vested with attributes such as 
organic solidarity, a Western sociological term applied to post-industrialised societies.
Nevertheless, Fadlallah’s aim was not to measure the prevalent social concepts and to 
compare them with the Islamic norms following the requirements of a scientifi c analysis. 
He had to convince his Shi΄i audience – “the despised” of Lebanon (a term applied by 
58 Open Letter 178.
59 AZANI 2011: 116; ALAGHA 2006: 208; HARIK 2004: 104.
The Views of Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah 237
Kramer)60 – of the self-suffi ciency of the Islamic social formula in terms of its capacity of 
empowerment. For this, Fadlallah combined elements of Medieval Islamic social thought 
(“commanding right and forbidding wrong”) with Western social concepts (organic unity, 
solidarity) and interpreted them in an Islamic way, to put forward a project of revitalising 
the ideal Islamic society in the modern age. 
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